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TO TWEET OR NOT TO TWEET: TWITTER,
“BROADCASTING,” AND FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 53
Jacob E. Dean*

I. INTRODUCTION
The qualities that make Twitter seem inane and half-baked are what
makes it so powerful . . . . 1
—Professor Jonathan Zittrain 2

So what exactly is Twitter? Twitter is a “microblogging” site that
allows registered users to answer one question—“what’s happening?”—
in 140 characters or less. 3 A microblog works much the way a
conventional blog does, only with a character limit. 4 Answers to this
singular question, known as “tweets,” can be sent via mobile texting,
instant message, or the internet. 5 In fact, the 140 character limit was
imposed specifically to allow tweets to be sent via text message (SMS). 6
Creating a Twitter account is free, and tweets can be easily integrated
with other forms of mass communication, such as websites, blogs, and
social networking sites. 7
Twitter is ubiquitous. As evidence, consider the following results of
three simple Google searches. The first search, for Twitter, produces
1.26 billion results. 8 A second search for the most important substance
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to give special thanks to his wife, Danielle, his daughter, Luci, and his son Elijah (who was born during
the writing of this Comment), for their patience during the writing process.
1. Noam Cohen, Twitter on the Barricades: Six Lessons Learned, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21cohenweb.html.
2. Professor Jonathan Zittrain is a professor at Harvard Law School and the co-founder and
faculty co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Jonathan Zittrain, Berkman Ctr. for
Internet & Soc’y, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/jzittrain (last visited April 12, 2010).
3. What Twitter Does, http://www.Twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
4. Denise Oliveri, What is Twitter and How does it Work?, SUITE101.COM, Jan. 3, 2009,
http://onlinepublishing.suite101.com/article.cfm/what_is_twitter_and_how_does_it_work.
5. What Twitter Does, supra note 3.
6. Twitter on Your Phone, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
7. Oliveri, supra note 4.
8. See Google Search: Twitter, http://www.google.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
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to human existence—water—produces 771 million results. 9 A third
search for the last name of the President of the United States—Obama—
only returns 189 million results. 10 While these results permit questions
regarding society’s priorities, it is clear that Twitter has staked a
foothold in today’s world.
In addition to the unsurprising coverage Twitter receives from news
services and tabloids, 11 Twitter’s recent surge in popularity 12 has also
pushed the San Francisco-based service into a much different forum—
federal courtrooms. In at least two cases over the last two years, federal
district judges have faced the same Twitter question head-on: Should
members of the press be allowed to report on federal criminal trials
directly from the courtroom via Twitter? In one case a judge answered
yes, in the other no. In reaching their respective conclusions, each judge
relied on a different Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.
Judge Clay Land, of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, denied a newspaper reporter’s request to update his
newspaper’s Twitter account using his “handheld electronic device (e.g.,
a BlackBerry or cellular telephone)” during a criminal trial. 13 In
reaching this decision, Judge Land determined that Twitter was
“broadcasting” for purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53
and was, therefore, prohibited. 14
In contrast, Judge Thomas Marten, of the District of Kansas, allowed
a reporter from the Wichita Eagle to tweet, from the courtroom, live
updates of the racketeering trial of six Crip gang members. 15 Judge
Marten cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), which grants a
9. See Google Search: Water, http://www.google.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
10. See Google Search: Obama, http://www.google.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
11. See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Twitter Ads Test Billion-Dollar Valuation, WIRED, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/04/twitter-tests-worth/; Lance Whitney, Bing Rolls Out RealTime Twitter Feed, CNET NEWS, Apr. 14, 2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10805_3-2000245475.html; Josh Rottenberg, Jim Carrey Responds to Flap Over Twitter Posts, ENT. WKLY., Apr. 13, 2010,
http://news-briefs.ew.com/2010/04/13/jim-carrey-responds-to-flap-over-twitter-posts/; Editorial, Jessica
Simpson on Her Hair-Raising Twitter Uproar: It’s ‘So Funny to Me,’ ACCESS HOLLYWOOD, Apr. 13,
2010, http://www.accesshollywood.com/news/jessica-simpson-on-her-hair-raising-twitter-uproar-its-sofunny-to-me_article_31148.
12. This assertion presumes that internet hits equal popularity. See, e.g., Nick Clark, Facebook
Overtakes Google, INDEP. (London), Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/
news/facebook-overtakes-google-1923102.html. Also, a Google search on January 29, 2010 produced
1.26 billion results for “Twitter,” but that amount increased to 1.41 billion by April 14, 2010. See
Google Search: Twitter, http://www.gogle.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
13. United States v. Shelnutt, No. 4:09-CR-14 (CDL), 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov.
2, 2009).
14. Id.
15. Associated Press, As Witnesses Sing, Journo's Twitter Tweets, CBSNEWS, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/06/tech/main4847895.shtml.
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judge broad discretion to regulate courtroom affairs. 16 He reasoned that
allowing Twitter would open the judicial process to the public, which
would lead to greater public understanding. 17 This understanding, he
asserted, would lead to the public viewing the federal courts with greater
legitimacy. 18
These two examples reach different outcomes, but the underlying
question is the same: Should Twitter have a place in federal criminal
courts? 19 Before proceeding further, however, Judge Land’s order raises
a threshold question that must first be answered: Can Twitter have a
place in federal criminal courts?
This Comment addresses both questions first by analyzing the history
and purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 in Part II. Part
III discusses the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and
the role that the Sixth Amendment rights of an impartial jury and public
trial play regarding this issue. Part IV argues that tweeting is not
broadcasting and is therefore permissible under Rule 53, that Twitter’s
use should be encouraged by federal courts, and that Twitter is important
as both a standalone technology and as a proxy for other new
technologies. Finally, Part V concludes that courts should reexamine the
issues surrounding broadcasting and determine that Twitter and other
technologies further the First and Sixth Amendment rights to a public
trial.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 53
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “Except as
otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit
the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings
or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.” 20
Any discussion on the use of technology in federal criminal courts
must start with this Rule because the Rule clearly prohibits
“broadcasting” judicial proceedings. As Part I indicates, however, what
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) (“A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal
law, these rules, and the local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed
for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules
unless the alleged violator was furnished with actual notice of the requirement before the
noncompliance.”).
17. Associated Press, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. This Comment focuses solely on the issue as it applies to criminal cases in federal court
proceedings. For an interesting discussion about the civil side of this issue, see the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, regarding the challenge to California’s Proposition 8 and the
use of video in the courtroom. 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010).
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 (emphasis added).
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constitutes “broadcasting” is not always clear. Understanding this Rule
and its history is essential to understanding whether Twitter should be
termed “broadcasting,” and therefore categorically prohibited by federal
courts.
A. Background of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The genesis of the current Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
Congress’s enactment of 54 Stat. 688 on June 29, 1940. 21 This Act,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771, authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe
general rules of criminal procedure prior to and including the verdict. 22
Pursuant to this Act, the Court adopted the original Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1944 and transmitted them to Congress via the
Attorney General in 1945. 23 The rules became effective on March 21,
1946. 24 Coupled with § 3772, which empowered the Supreme Court to
prescribe rules for all the proceedings following a verdict, § 3771,
though oft amended, governed federal criminal procedure until both
sections were repealed in 1988. 25
In 1988, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to grant the
Supreme Court authority to prescribe rules of criminal procedure for
federal district and appellate courts. 26 Congress passed this legislation
“to improve the administration of justice in this nation.” 27 Though the
Court has the power to prescribe amendments under the Act, the Judicial
Conference is authorized to recommend rules to the Court, 28 and does so
using committees of judges and practicing attorneys. 29 Pursuant to the
Act, the Court must submit to Congress any proposed amendments to
the Rules by May 1 of a given year, and such amendments cannot take
effect until December 1 of the year that the amendment was properly
submitted. 30 The purpose of such amendments is “to maintain

21. THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I,
VII (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/crim2009.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
27. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 22 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (2006). The Judicial Conference is a group of federal judges
summoned every year by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to survey the condition
of business in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
29. § 2073(a)(2).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006).
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consistency and otherwise promote the interest of justice.” 31 In
achieving that end, Congress made clear that “[s]uch rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 32
B. History of Rule 53
As originally worded, Rule 53 declared that, “[t]he taking of
photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial
proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court
room shall not be permitted by the court.” 33 At the time of Rule 53’s
inclusion in the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
behaviors prohibited by the Rule were not problematic for federal
courts. 34 Nevertheless, it was included to express “a standard which
[would] govern the conduct of judicial proceedings.” 35
Rule 53 was amended nearly sixty years later as a part of a general
restyling of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 36 This restyling
effort sought to make the Rules more stylistically consistent and more
easily understood. 37 The restyling of Rule 53 in 2002 was not without
consequence with respect to the issue presented by Twitter in the
courtroom. The word “radio” was removed from the Rule, leaving the
word “broadcasting” as the current standalone second prohibition. 38
The Advisory Committee did not view the removal of “radio” as a
substantive change. 39 Rather, it viewed the change as “one that accords
with judicial interpretation applying the current [R]ule to other forms of
broadcasting and functionally equivalent means.” 40 The committee
believed that a more generalized reference to “broadcasting” was
appropriate given modern technological capabilities, while also
recognizing that the Rule implicitly allows exceptions to the
“broadcasting rules” for limited purposes under other Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 41

31. § 2073(b).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
33. United States v. Cicilline, 571 F. Supp. 359, 361 (D.R.I. 1983), aff’d 740 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.
1984).
34. The issues had become problematic in state courts, so the adoption of the Rule was
preventative rather than corrective. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption.
35. Id.
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing cases that prohibit television proceedings and tape recordings).
41. Id.
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C. Purposes of Rule 53
Though the purposes of Rule 53 are not found neatly enumerated in a
single source, themes begin to emerge as one reads about Rule 53 and
similar rules of individual courts that regulate broadcasting. In having a
rule such as Rule 53 in place, legislators and judges seem to be trying to
ensure that at least two main objectives are met: judicial order and
procedural fairness. This subsection first discusses the two objectives
and their sources generally. Then, it focuses on a specific type of
procedural harm that a broadcasting prohibition tries to protect against—
psychological bias.
1. Ensure Judicial Order and Procedural Fairness
In 1944, the Advisory Committee stated that Rule 53 is to “govern the
conduct of judicial proceedings”; implicit in this assertion is a desire for
orderly behavior within the courtroom. 42 Then in 1962, the Judicial
Conference adopted a resolution concerning Rule 53 that sheds even
more light on the purposes of the Rule. In condemning photographs and
broadcasting in federal courts, the Conference found that the use of such
practices was inconsistent with fair judicial procedure. 43 Justice
William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, stated in a 1960 article for the American Bar Association Journal
that “[t]he courtroom by our traditions is a quiet place where the search
for truth by earnest, dedicated men goes on in a dignified atmosphere.”44
Though his article was specifically addressing the constitutionality of
Canon 35 of the American Bar Association’s Canons of Judicial Ethics,
Justice Douglas’s reasoning is instructive because the Canon addresses
the propriety of photography and broadcasting in the courtroom. 45
More explicitly, a federal judge from the District of Rhode Island
determined that “a strong inference arises to the effect that [the Rule’s]
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption.
43. United States v. Cicilline, 571 F. Supp. 359, 361–62 (D.R.I. 1983), aff’d 740 F.2d 952 (1st
Cir. 1984) (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 861, at 345).
44. William O. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A. J. 840, 841 (1960).
45. Id. Justice Douglas acknowledged that, “Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was written in the same tradition.” Id. He further stated that treating trials as entertainment “is to
deprive the court of the dignity which pertains to it and can only impede that serious quest for truth for
which all judicial forums are established.” Id. He also argued that the public trial guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment is for the benefit of the accused, not for the public’s entertainment or education. Id.
at 842. He asserted that even still photos could lower the public’s perception by showing only the
sensational moments of the trial. Id. He worried about the effect that mass opinion would have on the
outcome of a trial should it be opened up to broadcasting, concluding that mass opinion has no business
in the operation of the legal system. Id. at 843–44.
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natural and primary purpose is to prevent members of the press and
broadcast media from interfering with the business of the court and with
the right to a fair trial.” 46 The case, U.S. v. Cicilline, involved a defense
attorney who moved to suppress evidence of a tape-recorded
conversation that occurred between himself and a potential witness who
was working with the FBI. 47 Donning a recorder provided by the FBI as
part of an investigation, the potential witness had several conversations
with the defense attorney over the course of a day. 48 Their conversation
was recorded in the proximity of two courtrooms but was not part of any
court proceeding. 49
In construing the applicability of a local rule patterned after Rule 53,
the District Court of Rhode Island acknowledged that, at least
superficially, the recorded conversation fell within the plain meaning of
the local rule. 50 After analyzing the decisions of other courts as well as
resolutions passed by the Judicial Conference, the court concluded that
the purpose these rules—the local rule and Rule 53—was to maintain an
orderly and dignified environment for conducting solemn judicial
proceedings, free from ancillary distractions. 51 Relying on that purpose,
the court determined that the recording at issue was beyond the intended
reach of the local rule and was therefore permitted. 52
2. Protect Against Psychological Bias
An early and important case in understanding the purposes of Rule 53
is Estes v. Texas. 53 In Estes, the Court considered whether the defendant
was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when
he was convicted in a highly publicized, broadcasted trial. 54 Although a
state criminal trial, which precluded the application of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the case provides valuable insight into the link
between broadcasting courtroom proceedings and procedural inequities.
The initial hearings for Estes’s trial were carried by live radio and
television broadcast, and news photography was permitted throughout
the trial. 55 Justice Clark’s plurality opinion 56 discusses the physical
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Cicilline, 571 F. Supp. at 361.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 361.
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 536.
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surroundings of the initial hearings, which is instructive in
understanding the first purpose for prohibiting broadcasting—
maintaining judicial order. 57 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Warren noted “the inherent unfairness of television in the courtroom”
and determined that “its presence [was] inconsistent with the
‘fundamental conception’ of what a trial should be.” 58 Three members
of the plurality recognized that their decision largely rested on policy
considerations in determining the constitutional conception of a “trial,” 59
and the plurality determined that the defendant’s due process rights were
violated. 60
Though the pretrial hearings were not the picture of “judicial serenity
and calm to which petitioner was entitled,” 61 the actual trial was much
more subdued than the pretrial hearing. 62 For the trial, cameras and
newsreel photographers were limited to a booth constructed in the back
of the courtroom. 63 Despite this, Justice Clark recognized that it was
difficult for one to put “his finger on [television’s] specific mischief and
prove with particularity wherein [the defendant] was prejudiced.” 64
Shifting focus more to the intangible harms presented by television,
Justice Clark viewed the psychological impact that television has on
jurors as “perhaps of the greatest significance.” 65 Beyond the distraction
of the physical presence of the cameras, the plurality stated:
It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting that is felt by the juror
56. Estes was a plurality decision due to Justice Harlan’s limitation of the holding in his
concurrence:
My conclusion is that there is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in
the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the
considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the
countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was done
in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). His limitation of the holding to the specific case at hand does not
affect the discussion of whether cameras should be allowed in the courtroom.
57. At the hearing, at least twelve cameramen took motion and still pictures. Id. at 536 (plurality
opinion). Cables and wires were all over the courtroom and microphones were placed on the judge’s
bench, in front of the jury box and at counsels’ tables. Id. Thirty or more people were standing in the
aisles. Id. at 553. Both sides conceded that the activities of the media led to considerable disruption of
the trial. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 580 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
59. Id. at 582–83
60. Id. at 532, 534–35 (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 536.
62. Id. at 537.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 544.
65. Id. at 545.
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throughout the trial. We are all self-conscious and uneasy when being
televised. Human nature being what it is, not only will a juror’s eyes be
fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be preoccupied with the
telecasting rather than with the testimony. 66

Justice Clark further stated that it is impossible to calculate the
potential impact knowledge of a large audience could have on a
witness’s testimony. 67 He contended that embarrassment and a natural
human tendency for over-dramatization “may impede the search for the
truth.” 68 While the plurality acknowledged that some of these dangers
would be present in newspaper coverage, it concluded that “the
circumstances and extraneous influences intruding upon the solemn
decorum of court procedure in the televised trial are far more serious
than in cases involving only newspaper coverage.” 69
D. Modern Interpretation of Rule 53
As mentioned in Part I, in U.S. v. Shelnutt, a district judge for the
Middle District of Georgia denied a newspaper reporter’s request to
update his newspaper’s website via Twitter. 70 This subsection focuses
on the reasoning Judge Land used to reach this conclusion.
In denying the reporter’s request, the court found that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 53 prohibited tweeting from the courtroom and that
the Rule was not an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of the
press. 71 According to the court, the Rule prohibited tweeting because
“broadcasting” as used in the Rule included sending electronic messages
from the courtroom that described the trial proceedings
contemporaneously and were instantaneously available for public
viewing. 72
In reaching this broad definition of “broadcasting,” the court relied on
both the dictionary definition of the word and the 2002 Amendment to
Rule 53. The court found that the plain meaning of “broadcast” was
much broader than the mere dissemination of information via television
or radio that one often associates with the word; “broadcast” includes
“‘casting or scattering in all directions’” and the “‘act of making widely

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2, 2009).
71.
72.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 548.
United States v. Shelnutt, No. 4:09-CR-14 (CDL), 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
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known.’” 73 The court concluded that it could not reasonably be disputed
that tweeting would result in casting the trial proceedings to the general
public and thus making them more widely known. 74
Additionally, the court found that the drafters of the Rule intended for
it to reach beyond the scope of television and radio broadcasting. 75
Citing the 2002 Amendment, which dropped the adjective “radio” and
left a prohibition against “broadcasting” generally, the court determined
that tweeting was broadcasting within the meaning of the Rule. 76
Though the Advisory Committee did not view the 2002 Amendment as a
substantive change, the Committee did infer from its notes that the Rule
would cover additional types of broadcasting. 77
III. THE FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
While Part II provided the foundation for answering the question of
whether Twitter can be used to report on federal criminal proceedings,
this Part briefly addresses the same issue, but also lays the framework
for answering the question of whether Twitter should be used in that
context. Accordingly, this Part addresses the additional constitutional
issues involved, namely, the First and the Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. This Part outlines the public’s right to access criminal
trials, details the First Amendment’s relationship with the Sixth
Amendment in the context of criminal trials, and addresses the
constitutionality of Rule 53 in an effort to provide a holistic picture of
the constitutional issues involved.
A. First Amendment Right of Access to Criminal Trials
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate how court
proceedings are conducted, one must not take for granted being given
access to federal criminal courts in the first place.
The
acknowledgement of the public and press’s constitutional right to access
criminal trials was only made thirty years ago. 78 This subsection
discusses the establishment and limitations of this right.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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1. Establishing the Right of Access—Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
addressed the narrow question of “whether the right of the public and
press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States
Constitution.” 79
Richmond Newspapers involved the criminal
prosecution of a murder defendant that was in his fourth trial due to a
Virginia Supreme Court reversal and two mistrials. 80 The defense
attorney moved to have the fourth trial closed to the public, citing a
desire to keep information about the trial from leaking out and being
seen by jurors. 81 Persuaded by the defendant’s arguments, the trial court
ordered that the courtroom be kept closed except for witnesses when
they testified. 82 The local newspaper and its reporters, who were shut
out of the trial, appealed the trial court’s decision. 83
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was one of first
impression. 84 Justice Burger, writing for the Court, first looked to the
history of the trial, and in so doing, recognized that an open criminal
trial “has long been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an AngloAmerican trial.” 85 He then cited justifications supporting this attribute
provided by Hale and Blackstone—that an open trial gives an assurance
that the proceedings are fair, and discourages perjury, misconduct, and
decisions that are based on bias or partiality. 86 In addition, the Court
noted that open trials have therapeutic value to the community,
providing an emotional outlet, and discouraging vigilante justice by
individuals. 87
Justice Burger recognized that these reasons remained valid and
concluded that a presumption of openness is inherent in the very essence
of a criminal trial. 88 The Court determined that the right of access to
places traditionally open to the public, such as criminal trials, have long
been assured “by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press, and [the Constitutional drafters’] affinity to the right
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 573.
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of assembly is not without relevance.” 89 Relying on this information,
the Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment.” 90 The Court further declared that
without this right “important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the
press could be eviscerated.’” 91
2. Limitations on the Right of Access—Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court
Only a few years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court once again
faced a case involving the exclusion of the press from a criminal trial in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 92 Globe Newspaper involved
a Massachusetts statute, which as construed by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, required trial judges to exclude press from the
courtroom when an underage victim was testifying in certain sexual
assault cases. 93
In addition to the rationales provided in Richmond Newspapers,
Justice Brennan, in his opinion for the Court, gave more justifications
for recognizing a First Amendment right to access criminal trials.
Justice Brennan noted that as commonly understood one purpose of the
Amendment was “‘to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.’” 94 Another was to ensure that each citizen “can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.” 95
In sum, the First Amendment ensures that an
individual’s right to engage in political discussion is an informed one.96
The Court held, however, that the public’s right to access trials is not
absolute, 97 indicating that when the government restricts access to a
criminal trial, such actions must withstand strict scrutiny, specifically,
the government must show it has a compelling governmental interest
and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 98 The
Court determined that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
are subject to a lower level of scrutiny. 99 The Court concluded that the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 577.
Id. at 580.
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
Id.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606–07.
Id. at 607 n.17.
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Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it was construed as a
mandatory rule that did not allow for different determinations in
individual cases. 100 However, the Court emphasized that the First
Amendment did not stand as an absolute bar to excluding the press and
public from the courtroom when minor, sex-offense victims testify. 101
B. Intersection of the First and Sixth Amendments
In his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice White noted that
the Court would not have had to find the right of access in the First
Amendment if the Court, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, had construed
the Sixth Amendment to hold that the public had a right to access
criminal trials. 102 While the Court did not find that the public had a
right to access criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment in Gannett, it
did find such a right protected by the First Amendment in Richmond
Newspapers. 103
The Sixth Amendment is often referred to as just that—the Sixth
Amendment—without reference to what particular provision is being
discussed. However, the Sixth Amendment has two distinct guarantees
relevant to this Comment: (1) the right to a public trial and (2) the right
to a trial by an impartial jury. 104 It is necessary to distinguish between
these two provisions because each provision interacts differently with
the First Amendment.
As the Court noted in Estes, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial, is more for the benefit of the accused than the public. 105 A
public trial ensures that the accused is “fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned.” 106 The justifications used to support a public trial, are
similar, if not identical, to those used to support a First Amendment
right to public access in criminal trials. 107 In holding that the right of the
public and press to attend criminal trials is a First Amendment right in
Richmond Newspapers, the Court seemed to indicate that the
Constitution’s guarantees of an open criminal trial are two-fold: first, a
defendant’s right under the Sixth Amendment, and second, the public’s
100. Id. at 610–11.
101. Id. at 611 n.27.
102. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581–82 (1980) (White, J., concurring)
(citing Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)).
103. Though the Sixth Amendment was not the source of the public’s right of access, it still plays
an important role in the issues relevant to this Comment.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1965).
106. Id.
107. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
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right under the First Amendment.
While these two rights are harmonious, tension can arise between the
First Amendment’s right of access and the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury. In the vast majority of criminal
trials, a defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is not
threatened by pretrial publicity. 108 When the case is a “sensational” one,
however, tensions can develop between the accused’s right to an
impartial jury and the public’s right, including the press, to access
criminal trials. 109 Thus, when courts address the public’s right to access
criminal trials, it is against the backdrop of the accused’s right to an
impartial jury.
C. Constitutionality of Rule 53
As case law has clearly established, the public and press have a First
Amendment right to access criminal trials. At first blush, Rule 53 seems
to limit the right of access and could therefore be unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court, which prescribes the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure as outlined in the Rules Enabling Act, has not directly
addressed the constitutionality of Rule 53. 110 Four federal courts of
appeals, however, have found that Rule 53 is constitutional and that the
First Amendment right of access “does not include a right to televise,
record or otherwise broadcast federal criminal trial proceedings.” 111
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in U.S. v.
Hastings, was the first court to address the issue. 112 In Hastings, the
defendant—a federal judge on trial for conspiracy and obstruction of
justice—sought to have his trial televised. In support of his motion, he
cited his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. 113 Numerous media
outlets sought to intervene in the case, citing their First Amendment
right to access criminal trials. 114 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that recent Supreme Court decisions did not suggest that the
Court would find the exclusion of television cameras or other recording
devices an abridgement of the press’s First Amendment rights. 115
The Eleventh Circuit held that the press’s fundamental right to access
108. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976).
109. Id.
110. United States v. Moussaoui, 205 F.R.D. 183, 185 (E.D. Va. 2002).
111. Id.
112. United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983). See United States v. Shelnutt, No.
4:09-CR-14 (CDL), 2009 WL 3681827, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2009).
113. Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1279–80 n.6.
114. Id. at 1280.
115. Id.
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criminal trials was a right to attend trials, not a right to televise, record,
or broadcast trials. 116 The court reasoned that unlike the statute at issue
Globe Newspaper Co., Rule 53 does not close the trial from public
scrutiny and that Globe Newspaper was controlling. 117 In addition, the
court found that Rule 53 resembled a time, place, and manner restriction,
and was therefore subject to a lower level of scrutiny.118 The rule did
not bar people from the trial; rather, it restricted the manner that the
media could gather news. 119 Thus, the per se rule could withstand the
lower level of scrutiny, though the Massachusetts rule at issue in Globe
Newspaper could not withstand strict scrutiny. 120
The court weighed the interests in support of the media ban against
those in favor of allowing the media coverage and determined that
allowing the media coverage would only slightly advance First
Amendment interests. 121 In contrast, the court found the significant
interests of preserving court order and ensuring fair procedure supported
the rule. 122 Subsequently, three other circuit courts faced the same
issue, and all three held Rule 53 constitutional. 123
IV. ARGUMENT
If tweeting is characterized as “broadcasting,” then the inquiry is over
and Twitter could not have a place in federal criminal courts. This Part
argues that such a characterization is erroneous, that tweeting is not
broadcasting under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53, and that
Twitter can therefore be used in federal courts. This Part further argues
that not only can Twitter be used, but it should be used to further the
constitutional rights afforded the press and defendants. Finally, this Part
asserts that this issue is worth careful consideration because Twitter is a
proxy for other technological advances.
A. Twitter Can Be Used in Federal Courts
In Shelnutt, Judge Land determined that tweeting was broadcasting

116. Id.
117. Id. at 1281–82.
118. Id. at 1282.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1283–84.
122. Id. at 1284.
123. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Edwards, 785
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); Conway v. United States, 852 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1988).
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for purposes of Rule 53. 124 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Land
relied heavily on the dictionary definition of “broadcasting”; he was also
concerned with the contemporaneous nature of the communication. This
subsection argues that “broadcasting” does not lend itself to a plain
meaning analysis and asserts that “broadcasting” should be defined by
considering the harms that Rule 53 was meant to protect against.
Additionally, this subsection argues that the timing of the
communication is not an issue.
1. Dictionary Definition
Citing Webster’s dictionary, Judge Land determined that the plain
meaning of “broadcast” included “‘casting or scattering in all
directions’” and “‘the act of making widely known.’” 125 He reasoned
that one could not reasonably dispute that tweeting would result in the
details of a trial proceeding being made more widely known. 126 Further,
he stated that the Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 2002 Amendment
bolster this position because the Committee intended the Rule to cover
additional types of broadcasting. 127 A logical and judicially accepted
starting place to define a term is a dictionary, but the rationale behind
Judge Land’s decision falls short for two reasons.
First, he asserts that the “plain meaning” of broadcasting is broader
than just the dissemination of information via television or radio. 128 For
purposes of Rule 53, that assertion must be true if one reads the
Advisory Committee Notes. However, the Amendment does not
provide a blanket prohibition against anything that makes information
more widely known; rather, the Rule was amended to include
“functionally equivalent means.” 129 Judge Land failed to recognize this
limitation of the definition, and he fails to establish how Twitter and
television and radio are functionally equivalent means.
A second related problem is that the definition Judge Land employed
is over inclusive; tweeting was not allowed because it makes the
happenings of the court more widely known. Using his dictionary
definition, any form of press would be broadcasting because it takes
facts and disseminates them to the population at large. Under this

124. See supra Part II.D.
125. United States v. Shelnutt, No. 4:09-CR-14 (CDL), 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov.
2, 2009) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 280 (1993)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment.
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interpretation, newspaper, magazine, and television reporting would all
be prohibited under Rule 53. Any individual who attended a criminal
trial and talked to others about his or her experience would be
broadcasting. This result is untenable; therefore, broadcasting cannot be
defined so broadly as to prohibit anything that casts or scatters in all
directions, or makes information more widely known.
2. Functionally Equivalent Means
When a word has many different dictionary definitions, one must
draw its meaning from the context. 130 The context for Rule 53 is the
Advisory Committee Notes. The Notes make clear that broadcasting
should not be limited to radio, but should include other “functionally
equivalent means” such as television and audio recordings. 131 At first
glance, this information seems illustrative, but not altogether helpful.
The Notes do not explicate how to determine whether something is a
“functionally equivalent means.” However, a closer look at the phrase is
revealing.
The Committee could have stated that the Rule was meant to prohibit
functionally equivalent technologies, or functionally equivalent
processes, but it prohibits functionally equivalent means. Means are
defined as “how a result is obtained or an end is achieved.” 132 In
choosing the word means, the Committee seemed to show its concern
for ensuring the quality of the end product—the result of a criminal
prosecution. Having this purpose makes sense given the mission of the
Criminal Rules—“to improve the administration of justice in this
nation” 133 —and Rule 53’s goal of being a standard that would govern
the conduct of judicial proceedings. 134 Given this context, “functionally
equivalent means” should be judged by comparing the harms of the
technology in question to those harms Rule 53 is meant to protect
against.
Rule 53 is meant to ensure that a defendant receives due process and
has an impartial jury. The Rule works to protect these rights by
maintaining courtroom order and limiting the psychological bias that can
occur from knowing one is on television or radio. In amending the Rule,

130. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 828 (2010) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135
(1991)).
131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment.
132. Princeton WordNet Search 3.0, “Means,” http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/
webwn?s=means (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 22 (1988).
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 advisory committee’s note to 1944 amendment.
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the Committee recognized that, considering modern technology, it could
not enumerate all technological advances that would fit into this
category. For example, the Committee probably could not envision with
specificity that in 2010, an individual could use an iPhone to record
judicial proceedings, download the video to his or her computer, and
broadcast it to the general public on YouTube. While the Committee
could not have envisioned this exact scenario, the hypothetical typifies
why “broadcasting” was expanded—to protect against situations where
technologies could be differentiated from radio and television, but
present the same harms.
However, the use of Twitter in the courtroom does not give rise to the
same concerns that have been outlined in cases like Estes. 135 One can
use Twitter discreetly from a cell phone or Blackberry, preserving
judicial order. In addition, tweets are the world as one individual sees it;
they are filtered much like a newspaper column, which no matter how
objective it purports to be, comes through the eyes of the writer. The
risks of psychological harm by having a television in the courtroom are
not present when a reporter is tweeting on the proceedings. As Justice
Harlan stated in Estes:
The distinctions to be drawn between the accouterments of the press and
the television media turn not on differences of size and shape but of
function and effect. The presence of the press at trials may have a
distorting effect, but it is not caused by their pencils and note books. 136

Tweeting is the functionally equivalent means to typing up a newspaper
column on a laptop or writing a story with pen and paper, not to a
television broadcast.
3. Contemporaneous Nature of the Communication
A final issue that must be discussed in regard to allowing the use of
Twitter—the instantaneous nature of tweets—in reality is a red herring.
In prohibiting Twitter, Judge Land stated that “the contemporaneous
transmission of electronic messages from the courtroom . . . in a manner
such that [the messages] are widely and instantaneously accessible to the
general public, falls within the definition of ‘broadcasting.’”137 While
timing seems important, it does not affect the discussion. Television and
radio are prohibited all the time, not just in real time. This underscores

135. See supra Part II.C.2.
136. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 590 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
137. United States v. Shelnutt, No. 4:09-CR-14 (CDL), 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov.
2, 2009).
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that the psychological harms the Rule tries to prevent—juror bias—are
not a function of timing. Those harms are a function of the unfiltered
nature of television and radio, which results in the self-consciousness of
court actors. It does not matter that Twitter is instantaneous because
when one receives a filtered view of court proceedings, the risk of bias
due to the way someone looks, or the way they talk, is diminished.
Recording courtroom proceedings and showing them later does not
protect against the harm courts have worried about in regard to the
media; it is the filtering of the information that is the true concern.
B. Twitter Should Be Used in Federal Courts
Because Twitter is not “broadcasting” or a “functionally equivalent
means” of broadcasting under Rule 53, its use should be allowed in
federal criminal courtrooms. Just because something is permissible,
however, does not mean it is advisable. Courts may be hesitant,
especially without a compelling reason to do so, to move forward into
uncharted waters for fear the technological floodgates may open. This
Comment does not argue that the floodgates should be opened to all
types of technological advances; rather, it argues that careful
consideration should be given to individual technological advances as
their uses become mainstream. In undergoing this analysis, courts will
realize that some technologies like Twitter, do not harm the
Constitution, but actually promote it.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, using Twitter does not
violate a defendant’s rights to due process and an impartial jury. 138
Using Twitter, you do not need to worry about embarrassment or overdramatization affecting the search for truth. 139 One need not worry that
the court will not be able to retain a “solemn environment free from the
interferences which so often accompany modern news coverage of the
events” 140 when someone sends a tweet because the same interferences
do not apply. A person can tweet by discreetly pulling out his or her
phone and sending a message without noise, fanfare or interruption.
Some may legitimately question the wisdom in allowing Twitter in
the courtroom because of the possibility of abuse. Most Blackberries,
PDA’s, iPhones and the like, have picture taking capabilities and other
recording devices, which would allow the user to record portions of the
trial in clear violation of Rule 53. However, if people are going to cheat,
they are going to cheat regardless; courts have the power to punish those
138. See supra Part IV.A.
139. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 547.
140. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1970).
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who violate courtroom rules, and reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are subject to a lower level of scrutiny. 141 Those two tools
give courts power to police the use of technological advances, and such
worries should not deter federal courts from allowing the use of Twitter.
Moreover, courts should not be deterred because Twitter actually
furthers the constitutional underpinnings of a defendant’s right to a
public trial and the public’s right of access; “‘[t]he law, however, favors
publicity in legal proceedings, so far as that object can be attained
without injustice to the persons immediately concerned.’” 142 The more
open a trial is to the public, the more it benefits the accused. As Hale
and Blackstone noted, an open trial gives an assurance that the
proceedings are fair, and discourages perjury, misconduct, and decisions
that are based on bias or partiality. 143 In addition, legitimacy
necessitates transparency; “[t]o work effectively, it is important that
society’s criminal process ‘satisfy the appearance of justice.’” 144 Open
trials, as Justice Brennan noted, promote the discussion of governmental
affairs and ensure that our participation in government is informed.145
Another reason that Twitter should be allowed is that media
representatives are often given preferential seating in crowded trials. 146
Implicit in this practice is an acknowledgement of the value of reporters
as a source of information for the public discourse to which Justice
Brennan alluded. Justice Clark foreshadowed technologies like Twitter
when he said, “[t]he news reporter is not permitted to bring his
typewriter or printing press [into the courtroom]. When the advances in
these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without
their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.” 147
Twitter is such a case, and allowing its use is simply allowing a tool to
aid the press in its important role of communicating information to
society.
C. Twitter Is a Proxy for Other Forms of Technological Advances
Though this Comment has addressed the narrow issue of Twitter in
the federal criminal courtroom and concluded that its use should be

141.
142.
1927)).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 (quoting 2 COOLEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 931–32 (8th ed.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
Id. at 556 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397–98 (1979).
Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
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allowed, Twitter’s importance is more far-reaching. Twitter serves as a
proxy for many modern technological advances.
It represents
communication tools that can be used discretely and non-intrusively. It
represents tools of the press, which allow the media to more quickly and
accurately communicate with the public. Maybe Twitter is the
technology du jour—something that’s popularity will only fade with
time. But maybe it is not. Unless there is a technological Nostradamus
in existence, no one can determine Twitter’s longevity. However, such a
promise is not necessary. Technology will continue to progress and the
discussion of the issues surrounding Twitter will remain relevant,
regardless of its fate, because of what it represents.
Twitter is a proxy for all technologies that fit within the competing
constitutional issues involved and are constitutionally allowable. No
court should be able to disallow such technologies based on a Federal
Rule or the Constitution. Given that at least one court has already done
this with Twitter, and that the use of Twitter or similar technologies to
report on criminal trials is an issue that will increasingly arise, it is
important to look at the issues involved with such technologies before
too much precedent is hastily set. Twitter is easily rubberstamped as a
broadcasting technology and thrown into the prohibitive radio–television
boat. However, Twitter is not a fungible product with television or
radio, nor is it a functionally equivalent means. It is different, and
should be treated as such, recognizing its unique status as a technology
that balances the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
surrounding a criminal trial.
V. CONCLUSION
In Estes, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that changes in
technology would potentially give rise to a new analysis of the issues
surrounding “broadcasting” as the field of electronics developed. 148
Estes was decided forty-five years ago, and now is the time to reevaluate
the issues. Tradition and precedent are important in our American legal
system, but so are equity and justice. Once the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment issues of an impartial jury and due process are resolved,
one can see that the remaining constitutional issues involved—the First
and Sixth Amendment guarantees to a public trial—call out for more
openness. By taking a hard look at Twitter and the issues involved,
courts and scholars alike will find that Twitter, and possibly other
technological advances that have been or will be made, are not only

148. Id. at 551–52.
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constitutionally permissible, but constitutionally advisable.
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